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WEINTRAUB'S COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
THE CHAPTER ON TORTS
Robert A. Sedler*

It is no easy task to compress a discussion of choice of law in conflicts-torts cases into some 60 pages, as Profesor Weintraub has done,
particularly when the author is both giving an overview of what has
been happening in a area where "changes in judicial approaches to
conflicts problems have come most swiftly and been most dramatic,"'
and at the same time developing his own approach. Professor Weintraub has done a remarkable job in making the subject matter of
the chapter very comprehensible to the non-experts in the fieldlawyers, judges, law students; in fact everyone but another conflicts
professor-and has also provided a very useful exposition and analysis
for us "experts." I will briefly comment on the contents of the torts
chapter itself, and will then give my views on Professor Weintraub's
approach to choice of law in conflicts-torts cases, remembering that as
Professor Brainerd Currie once observed, "I know of no sincere way to
honor a scholar except to subject his scholarship to critical analysis."'
Professor Weintraub has performed a most valuable service by reminding us that the "place of the wrong" rule has not disappeared, as
academic commentary would sometimes indicate. He points out that
in recent years at least 10 jurisdictions have explicitly refused to abandon the place-of-the-wrong rule, and his analysis, in terms of policy
and interest, of cases decided under that traditional rule' is most enlightening. In his analysis, Professor Weintraub makes use of some
older cases--in Conflicts that means cases that are more than 5 years
old-which have not generally been considered leading ones, and demonstrates cogently the unsoundness of the results that were reached
under the place-of-the-wrong rule in comparison with the results that
would be reached under an "analysis of interests" approach. Because
this kind of comparison was so effective. I am disappointed that he did
not deal with the "state of the most significant relationship" approach
of the Second Restatement 4 more fully, and compare the results
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reached under this approach with those which would obtain under an
interest analysis. His brief discussion seems to display some ambivalency over the policy content of the Restatement approach, and he fails
to come down hard on the difference between its localizing, contactoriented methodology and the methodology of interest analysis. Dym
v. Gordon,5 which he discusses at length in another context, 6 would be
a good example of this difference. 7 This is really my only criticism as
to the content of the chapter.
Professor Weintraub has set forth his own approach most clearly and
concisely. He has traced the development of interest analysis-and of
the policy-centered approach in general-against the backdrop of the
place-of-the-wrong rule, demonstrating the very real differences in result that may be produced. His analysis of the interests of the various
contact states in applying their law on particular issues is most precise
and provides many insights as to how interest analysis should properly
operate. Somehow he manages to focus on most of the problems that
arise and to pretty much "cover the field," a task difficult to achieve in
one chapter of a treitise. All in all, the chapter on torts represents a
very valuable contribution to conflicts scholarship.
I turn now to a discussion of the substantive aspects of Professor
Weintraub's approach to choice of law in conflicts-torts cases. It is not
really possible, however, to discuss someone else's approach without
first making clear-as briefly as possible-your own approach." Like
Professor Weintraub, I believe that interest analysis is the soundest
way to go about solving conflicts problems, particularly in the torts
area. However, unlike Professor Weintraub, I adhere to Professor
Currie's view that in the case of a true conflict-which I define a bit
diffferently from Professor Currie by emphasizing real as opposed
to hypothetical interests9-the forum should apply its own law.
Secondly, I am very much concerned with judicial method and with
the behavior of courts in dealing with the kinds of cases that actually
do arise. It is my conclusion that conflicts cases, particularly in the
torts area, fall into certain fact-law patterns, and that courts can resolve these cases based upon considerations of policy and fairness to
616 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.EM 792 (1965).
6
Commh
ARY 239-44.
7
See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the PolicyCentered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 75-78 (1967).
8
See generally Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 7; Sedler,
Characterization,Identification of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RUTGERS-CAmEN L. Buv. 8
(1970); Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 I)uQuEsNE L. REa. 394 (1971).,

0 See Sedler, Symposium-Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEXs L. Buv. 224, 225 (1971).
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the parties. Court decisions in particular cases will serve as precedents for future ones, and in time a judicially established body of conflicts law may emerge. This orientation causes me to analyze
"academic solutions" with reference to their impact on and relevancy
for judicial behavior in conflicts cases.
Professor Weintraub's approach calls first for identifying and eliminating what he calls spurious conflicts, and then for providing a
rational basis for resolving true ones. He says that a spurious conflict
is present "when two or more jurisdictions, having some contact with
the parties or the occurence, have tort rules pointing to different results, but, upon analysis of the purposes underlying the putatively
relevant and divergent rules, it becomes apparent that one rule and
one rule only is rationally applicable to the case in issue."' 0 This will
occur when one state would substantially and legitimately advance its
own policies if its rule were applied, but the contacts of the other states
are such that their policies, if given effect, "would officiously interfere
with the policies of the first state.""' He later uses as classic examples
of spurious conflicts the situation of two spouses from a non-immunity
state involved in an accident in a state that still recognizes spousal immunity, 2 and the situation of two parties from a state that does not
have a guest statute involved in an accident in one that does.13
He then points out that there is not a sharp dividing line between
spurious and true conflicts, but that, "there is a spectrum of torts conflicts situations," wih spurious conflicts at one end and true conflicts
at the other, and that "between these extremes are cases in which
reasonable men may differ as to whether more than on state's policies
are relevant"' 4 But he then drops the matter and moves on to the
true conflict. I think there is an important gap in his approach here,
and that explicit attention should be given to what Professor Currie
has called the "unprovided for case," the case where neither state has
an interest in applying its law on the issue as to which the laws differ.' 5
For example, a State A resident is killed in State A while operating a
machine manufactured in State B by a State B corporation. State A
has a limitation on the amount of damages recoverable for wrongful
death; State B does not. The case is neither a spurious conflict nor a
true one, because neither state has an interest in applying its law on
the particular issue: State A has no interest in applying its limitation

10 Comisuay 201.
"11 d.
'2 Id. at

228.
13 Id. at 212.
'4 Id. at 202.
15 See B. Cmu,
Survival of Actiono: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, in S..cTm EssAYs oN TH ComricT or LAws 128, 152-53 (M963).
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policy for the benefit cf the State B defendant; State B has no interest
in allowing unrestricted recovery to the beneficiaries of a State A
decedent killed in State A.:"
Professor Weintraub does not explicitly deal with this kind of case,
nor does he indicate how he would decide it.' 7 It is necessary to take
account of such cases since they do arise in practice, and to consider
policies other than thcse reflected in the laws -that differ. In the example I have given, it may be observed that all states have a common
policy of imposing liability for wrongful death, and limitations on this
liability are an exception to that common policy.' 8 This being so, where
the only state interested in limiting the defendant's liability-his home
state, where he will be required to bear the loss or carry insurance to
cover it-does not do so, there is no reason to depart from the common
policy of both states in allowing recovery for wrongful death, and unlimited recovery should be allowed. I would say as a general proposition that in the ordinr-xy accident case, where the defendant's home
state imposes tort liability, he should be held liable irrespective of
where the plaintiff resides or where the accident occurs. Professor
Weintraub's approach does not really deal with this kind of problem,
and I think that is a significant omission.
When it comes to the true conflict, Professor Weintraub would not
give up and apply the law of the forum.' 9 I am in full agreement
with his view as to what constitutes a true conflict, namely, the situation that exists when each state has a legitimate and real interest in
having its own rule applied. He distinguishes, as I do, between real
and hypothetical interests, pointing out, as an illustration, that when
two parties from an immunity state-a state that has a guest statute,
for example-are involved in an accident in a non-immunity state,
any interest of the state of injury in allowing compensation to the
non-resident plaintiff is "officious and hypothetical."20 But where the
conflict cannot be avoided, he would look for a rational basis for re
solving the conflict, and he suggests four criteria which will help the
court arrive at that resolution. First is the general direction of substantive tort law toward distributing losses resulting from accidents,
16 See Ryan v. Clark Eqaipment Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal Rptr. 329
(1969).
17Drawing an analogy to the criteria employed by Professor Weintraub in
resolving true conflicts, see text accompanying note 19 infra, I think that he
would allow unlimited recovery.
18 Every American state has a wrongful death act. W. PRossm, LAW OF TORTS
902 (4th ed. 1971). Despite variations in the way that different states compute
damages, the policy is one of recovery and an express limitation on the amount
recoverable must be viewed as an exception to that policy.
9CODmiENTARY 203.
20 Id. at 246.
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which argues in favor of allowing the plaintiff to recover.21 A second
criterion is the general desirability of avoiding unfair surprise to the
unwary defendant. Professor Weintraub does not see this factor as a
significant element in tort cases, because (1) the individual defendant
is not likely to have shaped his conduct to take account of rules of
liability for negligence or the measure of damages, and (2) in any
event, he is likely to have been insured. 22 Unfair surprise would be
relevant only in the context of a showing that the nominal defendant
did not foresee any liability for his conduct and therefore failed to take
out liability insurance, or that he would have taken out more liability
insurance than he did if he could have foreseen that his liability
would be measured by standards of compensation different from the
standards obtaining in the place where he acted. As to the insurer,
Professor Weintraub points out that insurance rates are not based upon
individual cases, but upon great numbers of cases, and that in light of
insurance rating and reserve practices, "to talk of 'surprising' the

insurer is very likely to be talking nonsense." 23 The third factor is that
of anachronism. Where the conflict is between "a rule that is in step
with general modern trends in the area, and a rule that is clearly an
anachronistic lag... resolution should be in favor of the rule that is

more representative of current developments.12 4 He carefully distinguishes the anachronism factor from the so-called "better rule"
approach, 25 which he roundly and properly rejects. 2 It should be
noted that any tmie a court has looked to the "better rule," that rule
has, not coincidentally, been its own.2 7 Anachronism, by contrast, is
intended as an objective standard-it attempts to demonstrate by a
scrutiny of legislative and case developments over past years that the
rule in question is being displaced or modified in favor of the competing
more modem rule. A rule is not anachronistic merely because the
judges consider is to be undesirable. A guest statute, for example, can
hardly be said to be anachronistic when twenty-six states have such
statutes and two others require a showing of more than ordinary
21 See

id. at 204.

22 Id. at 205.
23

Id. at 206.

24 Id.
2

5 See generally Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CALi. L. RvV. 1584, 1588 (1966).
2
6 COnnnErmy 207.
27 See Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Conklin v. Homer,
38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). For rejections of the '%etter rule" when
it was not the rule of the forum, see, e.g., Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp.
533 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); DeFoor v.
Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968).
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negligence for a guest passenger to recover against his host driver.281
Finally, a court should look to the state's choice-of-law decisions delineating the cases in which it would apply its substantive law. Such
an analysis may serve as a guide to the purposes underlying that law,
and to the state's interest in applying such law to the situation in
question.2 9 As a shorthand statement of "all that has been said" in
regard to the above criteria, Professor Weintraub proposes the following formulation: "An actor is liable for his conduct if he is liable under
the law of any state whose interests would be advanced significantly
by imposing liability, unless imposition of liability would unfairly
surprise the actor."3 0
I tend to be somewhat skeptical about proposals for resolving ue
conflicts, at least in the tort area, largely because the case in which the
forum would be expected to displace its law under these proposals is
unlikely ever to arise inx practice, and secondly because whenever a
court has been faced with a true conflict, it has almost invariablyunless it continues to apply the place of the wrong rule-ended up by
applying its own law.3' In terms of the torts cases that actually arise
in which true conflicts are presented, then, the forum court has applied
its own law, as Professor Currie advocates,32 and more significantly, in
these cases the commentatorsthat have attempted to resolve true conflicts would usually agree that this is how the particularcase should
have been decided.33 I vll try to illustrate these points with reference
to the formulation that ]rofessor Weintraub has proposed.
Suppose that a resident of a state that does not have a guest statute
is injured there while a passenger in a vehicle that is operated by a
driver from a guest-statute state. This is obviously a true conflict.
The victim's home state is interested in applying its law to allow recovery to its resident who was injured there. The driver's home state,
where the vehicle is insured and where insurance rates theoretically
will be affected, is equally interested in protecting its resident, or more
accurately, his insurer, no matter where the accident occurs. Professor
Currie would say that courts in the plaintiffs home state should apply
that state's own law in a true conflict. Professor Weintraub would
2

8 Co miNTARY 207.

20

See id. at 207-203.

so Id. at 209.
31
See authority cited notes 34, 36, 38, 41, infra and accompanying text.
32

B.

Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in
181-82 (1963).
33
In addition to Professor Weintraub I am thinking particularly of Professor
CuRmE,

SELECTED EssAYs ON Tim Coi.LicT OF LAs s

Cavers.

See

generally D. CAVERS,

THE CHOICE OF

LAw PRocEss 139-80 (1965).

Since Professor Ehrenzweig rejects interest analysis entirely, he does not approach the problems in terms of "true" or "false" conflicts.
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resolve the true conflict in favor of the application of the law of the
plaintiff's state, since its interests would be advanced significantly by
the application of its law and since the imposition of liability would
not unfairly surprise the actor. They disagree only about what the
defendant's home state should do: Professor Currie would say that it
should apply its own law in a true conflict and Professor Weintraub
would say that it should defer to the policy of the plaintiffs home state.
But this case will never arise. The plaintiff will sue in his home state,

obtaining jurisdiction under the non-resident motorist or non-resident
tortfeasor's act and that state will apply its own law, as Professor
Currie and Professor Weintraub would both advocate.34 As Professor
Weintraub points out in the chapter on jurisdiction, there is a strong
relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law: whether the forum
can or will apply its own law is a relevant factor to consider in determining whether it may take jurisdiction.3 5 In terms of predictability of
result, the relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law is even
more clear. In the case of a true conflict the plaintiff will sue in his
home state if he can obtain jurisdiction there, and that state is almost
certain to apply its own law. Speculating on what the defendant's home
state would or should do if suit were brought there may be an interesting academic exercise, but it is totally irrelevant to the realities of conflicts litigation. By -thesame token, in a true-conflict situation, if the

plaintiff is unable to obtain jurisdiction in his home state, such as where
he is injured in the defendant's home state and the defendant is not
otherwise amenable to process in the plaintiffs state, the plaintiff may
as well not waste his time by suing in the defendant's state, because
if he does that state will apply its own law.38
The matter of where suit is brought becomes all the more significant
in the illustrative situation just described when the injury occurs in
the defendant's home state and the defendant wants the plaintiff to
recover. If the defendant desires such a result, he will allow himself
to be served in the plaintiff's home state.37 Guest-statute cases are a
good example of this principle. In such cases, there will almost always
have been a prior relationship between the parties-the fictitious ungrateful hitchhiker has not made his appearance in an actual conflicts
case-and the nominal defendant wants the plaintiff to recover against
the former's insurance company. Here again, Professor Weintraub,
looking to the interest of the plaintiffs home state in allowing recovery
and the clear absence of unfair surprise to either the nominal defendant or his insurer, would agree that the plaintiffs home state should
3

4 See Sedler, Characterization,supra note 8, at 66-67.

3

5 Comm'TARY 67-69.

3

37

See Satchwill v. Vollrath Co, 293 F. Supp. 533, 535 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
See Sedler, The TerritorialImperative, supra note 8, at 399-401.
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apply its own law. A problem may exist, however, because of what
may be called the "territorial hang-up." Where some of the facts
leading up to the accident, such as the origin of the trip, occurred in
the plaintiff's home state, that state has had no difficulty in applying its
own law.s" But in Cipolla v. Shaposka,39 where the accident occurred
in Delaware-a guest-statute state--on a trip originating in Delaware
and involving a Pennsylvania plaintiff and a Delaware defendant, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Delaware law in denying recovery and thus became one of the few policy-centered courts in recent
years to not apply its own law in a tort case presenting a true conflict.
Professor Weintraub, interestingly enough, would disagree with the
result in that case. While paying some obeisance to the "territorial
hang-up" by saying that the plaintiff's home state should not apply its
law unless either the defendant or his course of conduct that resulted
in the injury had some nexus with it, he then proceeds to propose an
exception that swallows up the rule by saying that the plaintiff should
be able to recover under his home state's law if he boarded the vehicle
there or if the trip was intended to or in fact did end there.40 This
exception covers the few guest-statute cases that have arisen in this
vein, including Cipolla. Only the "territorial hang-up" could have
caused the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to decide Cipolla as it did, and
here again Professor Weintraub and Professor Currie would agree that
Pennsylvania should have applied its own law.
Miller v. Miller4 ' was another case involving a true conflict where
the defendant wanted the plaintiff to recover. At the time of the fatal
accident the defendant was a resident of Maine, which then had a
$20,000 limitation on the amount of damages recoverable for wrongful
death. The victim, a resident of New York prior to his death, was the
defendant's brother, and the accident occurred while he was visiting
the defendant in Maine, The defendant subsequently moved to New
York, where suit, of course, was brought by his brother's survivors.
Doubtless, if he had not moved to New York, he would have allowed
himself to be served there. At the time of the suit Maine had also
removed the limitation. The New York court applied its own law
to allow unlimited recovery, and again Professor Weintraub seemingly
agrees with the result, but here on the ground that post-accident
changes in residence may properly be considered in determining interrest analysis where this does not produce unfairness nor penalize a
38 See

Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Schneider v. Nichols,

280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
39 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
40
COmm=ARy 248-49.

4122 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.2 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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party for the change of residence. 42 The New York court, after
emphasizing its interest in allowing unlimited recovery and pointing
out how this produced no unfairness to the Maine insurer, did note that
the defendant was now a New York resident and that the Maine limitation had since been removed.
I would submit that the result in Miller would have been no different if the nominal defendant had not changed his residence to New
York. New York had a clear interest in allowing the beneficiaries of a
New York decedent to obtain unlimited recovery, particularly against
a nominal defendant who wanted them to recover. The insurance
policy covered out of state accidents and, as the court observed, insurance policies do not distinguish between liability for personal injuries
and liability for wrongful death. Thus, the insurance company could
expect to be held to unlimited liability, and it was not prejudiced by
being held to that standard merely because the accident occurred in
New York. I would also add that the insurance company was doubtlessly doing business in New York and it is certainly reasonable for
New York courts, under a "benefit theory," to hold the company to the
New York standard whenever one of its residents is injured out of
state by the company's insured. 43 Using the interest and fairness criteria then, the application of New York law would be proper whenever
a New York resident was killed or injured by a person insured with a
company doing business in New York. Only the "territorial hang-up"
would produce a different result.The point that I wish to emphasize is that in actual practice tort cases
presenting true conflicts are almost invariably decided under the sub-

42

CoMAi rny 249-53.
In Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.Zd 1272 (2d Cir. 1971), the court held that New
York would not apply its law to allow recovery where the guest-passenger was
a resident of New York, the defendant was a resident of Florida, a guest-statute
state, and the accident occurred in Ohio, also a guest-statute state. Jurisdiction
was obtained in New York quasi in rem by attachment of the insurance policy
obligation of the defendant's insurer under Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216
N..2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). This case raises most cogently the question
of whether the forum should hold an insurer doing business in the forum to
the forum's standard whenever a forum resident is insured by one of its outof-state insureds. The court never considered this question, making the completely erroneous observation that, "We think we can safely assume that the
Swarners' insurance premiums were calculated with the Florida guest statute
in mind." 445 F.2d at 1277. There was also no discussion of Miller v. Miller,
22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 NE.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). The accident occurred
on a return trip from New York to Ohio and the trip originated in Ohio. It
may be queried whether the New York Court of Appeals would have reached
the same result.
44 See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra note 8, at 406-07.
43
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More

importantly, the formulation for resolving true -conflicts that Professor
Weintraub has proposed would produce the same result in all of these
cases. The cases in which he would argue that the forum should displace its own law in a true conflict simply do not arise. In terms of
predicting the behavior of courts in actual cases, Professor Currie has
carried the day: the forum will almost invariably apply its own law,
assuming that it has abamdoned the place of the wrong rule or unless it
is caught in a "territoial hang-up" as in Cipolcl. Solutions to true
conflicts based on "a rational basis for resolving such conflicts" may be
academically interesting, but may not have much relevance for the
real world in which the non-experts must operate.
45 See authority cited note 32 supra. In Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d
1146 (1st Cir. 1971), it was held that New Hampshire would not apply its tort
law, apparently imposing ELhigher duty of care, in favor of a New Hampshire

plaintiff injured while working on land located in Massachusetts, in a suit
against a corporation having its principal place of business in Massachusetts. The
"territorial imperative" seems even stronger when the injury occurs on the defendant's land located in another state. See generally 450 F.2d at 1152. Since
the corporation was subjec-; to suit in New Hampshire, it may be assumed that
it was doing business there. However, the issue involved the duty of care owed
to an invitee, and it could be argued that there may have been some reliance
on the Massachusetts standard. Barrett is a hard case, but if the decision is
correct, it is because that application of New Hampshire law would be unfair
in light of the fact that the defendant may have conformed its behavior to the
requirements of the Massachusetts standard.

